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ABSTRACT 
  Courts and commentators have struggled with the problem of 
cabining digital searches while still allowing law enforcement 
sufficient latitude to be efficient and effective. This Note examines 
current proposals, such as requiring search protocols or abandoning 
the plain view doctrine, before proposing a solution of its own: 
revisiting the constitutional requirement of particularity in the 
warrant. Focusing on particularity is not new; the problem is 
describing, ex ante, where to search within a corpus of seized data. 
The language of files and folders is both inadequate and incoherent 
for this task, but in rejecting it, courts have largely given up on 
particularly describing where in the data to search. 
  Data is information, and information has meaning—semantics. 
Computers are increasingly able to sort and segregate data according 
to the human meaning it represents. Accordingly, magistrate judges 
can describe, ex ante in natural language, the type of data that 
examiners may search based on the evidence sought. Forensic 
examiners can then use automated tools to retrieve information 
responsive to that semantic description without searching the entirety 
of the data. Thus, the privacy of suspects, guilty and innocent, can be 
protected without giving up the plain view doctrine or compromising 
effective law enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of electronic storage media (ESM) and electronically 
stored information (ESI)1 has confounded the law of search and 
seizure. Can data be “searched”?2 When does that happen?3 What is a 
“particular” warrant or a “reasonable” search?4 What are the limits 
on the purview of plain view?5 The widespread use of ESM and ESI 
has resulted in difficult questions going to the heart of the balance 
between law-enforcement and privacy interests. Courts have charted 
a haphazard course through this minefield,6 generally—though not 
always—paying lip service to privacy concerns while allowing law 
enforcement unfettered and unprecedented discretion in the 
execution of searches and seizures.7 
 
 1. This Note occasionally uses the terms hard drive and data as generic stand-ins for ESM 
and ESI, respectively. 
 2. Compare Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531, 551–54 (2005) (proposing that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when ESI is exposed to 
human observation), with Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 
163 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2011) (denying that an examination of ESM is a search at 
all). 
 3. See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1241, 1248 (2010) (observing that computer searches entail a physical search and seizure 
followed by an electronic search). For one court’s explanation of this two-stage practice, see 
infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that searches not be “unreasonable” and that 
warrants “particularly describ[e]” their objects). Compare, e.g., United States v. Hill (Hill II), 
459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the requirement that searches must be reasonable 
is sufficient to constrain computer searches without more), with id. at 974 (observing that every 
file on seized ESM must necessarily be examined (quoting United States v. Hill (Hill I), 322 F. 
Supp. 2d 1081, 1088–89 (C.D. Cal. 2004))). 
 5. Bryan K. Weir, It’s (Not So) Plain To See: The Circuit Split on the Plain View Doctrine 
in Digital Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 83, 92–93 (2010) (observing that spatial and 
temporal constraints on the scope of physical searches do not apply to computer searches). 
 6. Compare, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(suppressing the results of a search that exceeded the scope of the warrant and suggesting a 
number of techniques to minimize exposure of irrelevant information), with United States v. 
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009) (refusing to suppress the results of a very similar 
search that used none of those techniques). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that a warrant 
“lacked meaningful parameters on an otherwise limitless search of Rosa’s electronic media,” 
but was not “so defective that an officer [would] lack a reasonable basis for relying upon it”); 
United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006) (purporting to “understand the 
heightened specificity concerns in the computer context” and yet refusing to require any such 
specificity). But see United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1170, 
1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating a search, albeit on narrow 
grounds); id. at 1178–80 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (proposing extensive ex ante regulations). 
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As always in search and seizure law, the tradeoff is between 
ensuring effective law enforcement and vindicating legitimate privacy 
concerns. The question is how to maintain the balance reached in the 
physical realm when conducting search and seizure in the electronic 
domain.8 It has become clear that physical rules cannot be 
transplanted, unchanged, to the world of digital search and seizure 
without upsetting that balance.9 In response, magistrate judges have 
recently begun requiring a search protocol in the warrant—
prescribing, ex ante, how a computer search is to be executed10—but 
at least one prominent scholar has attacked this practice on both 
constitutional and normative grounds.11 
This Note proposes a way to regulate computer searches that is 
both firmly grounded in the Constitution and normatively attractive. 
As a starting point, this Note assumes the necessity of broad 
overseizure of ESI12 and adopts Professor Orin Kerr’s definition of a 
search of data: exposure to human observation, by way of a display, 
printer, or other output device.13 This Note proposes that a warrant to 
search ESI should be limited to a semantic zone—a nontechnical 
description of the type of content an agent may lawfully search, based 
on the evidence that the government has probable cause to search for. 
As a brief preliminary example, if the government has established 
probable cause to search for pay-owe sheets related to drug 
trafficking, the appropriate semantic zone to search would be text 
document and spreadsheet data.14 This Note further proposes that in 
ESI cases, magistrate judges perform a new, supervisory function, 
conducted through their traditional role of vetting warrants. 
 
 8. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (“When new tools and new practices threaten to expand or 
contract police power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment 
protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”). 
 9. See Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1176 (noting the “serious risk that every 
warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the 
Fourth Amendment irrelevant”). 
 10. See infra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.  
 12. See infra Part I.B. For a cogent discussion of what it means to “seize” ESI, see generally 
Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700 (2010). 
 13. Kerr, supra note 2, at 551–54. 
 14. This may seem to be a broad zone, but it would exclude, for example, the suspect’s 
videos and pictures. For a discussion of a case in which this would have made a difference, see 
infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
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The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part I starts with 
a sketch of Fourth Amendment search doctrine concentrating on the 
particularity requirement, followed by a discussion of the two-stage 
nature of computer searches. Part II introduces two paradigmatic 
problems arising from the search of seized ESI and critiques the 
solutions proposed so far. Part III argues that the root of the problem 
is the lack of particularity in searches of ESI. It then evaluates current 
conceptions of ESI and argues that they are inadequate to articulate 
particularity limits before proposing a new perspective—the semantic 
perspective—which gives rise to semantic zones. Finally, Part IV 
explores the application of those rules in various real and 
hypothetical test cases. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Searches Under the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment regulates government searches and 
seizures.15 A Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government 
violates a personally held and objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy.16 The general rule is that a government search is “per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” unless pursuant to 
either a warrant or one of “a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”17 To obtain a warrant, the government must 
have probable cause to believe that specific evidence of a specific 
crime will be found in a specific place.18 Probable cause is a “fair 
probability” under the totality of the circumstances that the search 
will discover evidence of a crime.19 The government’s determination 
 
 15. The text of the Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 16. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). The Supreme Court has recently made 
clear that in addition to this test, a search occurs when the government “obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
950 n.3 (2012). 
 17. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 & n.4 (1990) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 825 (1982)). 
 18. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
 19. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Supreme Court has consistently refused 
to further articulate the contours of the probable-cause standard. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 
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of probable cause must be vetted by a “neutral and detached 
magistrate,” who may, if he agrees that there is probable cause, issue 
a warrant for the search.20 
A warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”21 The Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment were concerned with preventing the practice of general 
warrants used in England, as well as the related writs of assistance in 
the Colonies, which authorized the Crown’s customs officers to 
rummage through the homes of colonists and seize prohibited or 
uncustomed goods.22 The requirement that both the object of the 
search and the place to be searched be particularly described in the 
warrant is the primary safeguard against general searches.23 
The particularity requirement is a function of what the police 
know at the time they seek the warrant. With regard to places, the 
leading case is Maryland v. Garrison,24 in which police had probable 
cause to search one third-floor apartment but, unaware that the floor 
comprised multiple apartments, requested a warrant for the entire 
floor.25 The Court held that “if the officers had known, or even if they 
should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on 
the third floor . . . they would have been obligated to exclude 
respondent’s apartment from the scope of the requested warrant.”26 
Similarly, the object of the search may be described by a “generic 
classification[]”—for example, “currency”—but “only when a more 
 
540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of 
the circumstances.”); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common-sense decision . . . .”). 
 20. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 22. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1976); United States v. Marron, 275 U.S. 
192, 195 (1927). For a canonical account of the colonies’ experience with writs of assistance, see 
generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51–78 (1937). 
 23. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). 
 24. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
 25. Id. at 85. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). The Court upheld the ensuing search because the officers had 
not, in fact, known, and acted reasonably upon realizing that the floor contained two 
apartments. Id. 
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precise description is not possible,” as when police do not know every 
relevant serial number.27 
Once a search is underway, the object of the search constrains 
where law enforcement may reasonably search.28 As the Seventh 
Circuit memorably put it, “[i]f you are looking for an adult elephant, 
searching for it in a chest of drawers is not reasonable.”29 Thus, even 
in the absence of a pinpoint description of where to search within the 
particular place, the description of the thing to be seized—itself 
particularized by probable cause—limits the scope of the search. 
The plain view doctrine is an important exception to the warrant 
requirement for seizures. An officer may seize an object without a 
warrant as long as three conditions are met: (1) the object has 
lawfully come into the officer’s view, (2) “its incriminating character 
[is] ‘immediately apparent,’” and (3) the officer has “a lawful right of 
access to the object.”30 In Horton v. California,31 for example, the 
warrant only authorized a search for the proceeds of a robbery, 
“including three specifically described rings.”32 The Court held that 
seizure of the weapons used in the robbery did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because they were discovered in the course of a lawful 
search, and it was immediately apparent that they were the weapons 
used in the robbery.33 
 
 27. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1980). The canonical test for 
“whether a description [of the thing to be seized] is sufficiently precise” is set out in United 
States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986): 
(1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in 
the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing 
officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; and (3) 
whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of 
the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued. 
Id. at 963 (citations omitted). 
 28. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless 
search . . . is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause 
to believe that it may be found.”). The search at issue in Ross was warrantless, but the Court 
reasoned that the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile, justified by probable cause, is 
identical to the scope of the search a magistrate could have authorized in a particular warrant, 
justified by probable cause. Id. at 823. Thus, the rule for searches generally is that the object of a 
search defines its permissible scope. Id. at 824. 
 29. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 30. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 & n.7 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
 31. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
 32. Id. at 131. 
 33. Id. at 142. 
ACHARYA IN PRINTER PROOF  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:51 PM 
2013] SEMANTIC SEARCHES 399 
Enforcement of the Fourth Amendment is primarily manifested 
in the exclusionary rule34—a “judicially created remedy”35 under 
which defendants may move to suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The primary rationale 
for the exclusionary rule is that suppressing illegally obtained 
evidence should deter the police from violating the Fourth 
Amendment, “‘by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”36 
B. Searches of ESI 
The story of ESI searches begins at the “dawn of the information 
age,”37 with United States v. Tamura,38 a case about paper records “so 
intermingled that they [could not] feasibly [have been] sorted on 
site.”39 The Tamura court held that in such a case, officers may seize 
all the documents as long as they seal them “pending approval by a 
magistrate of a further search.”40 A few years earlier, the Supreme 
Court had held that, in searches of intermingled records, it was 
unavoidable (and therefore permissible) to examine “some innocuous 
documents . . . at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they 
are, in fact, among those papers [sought].”41 Thus, the stage had been 
set for broad overseizure and modern searches of ESI. 
Twenty-four years later, the Ninth Circuit supplied, in United 
States v. Hill,42 one of the clearest articulations of the broad 
overseizure practice. The defendant, accused of possessing child 
pornography, argued that the warrant was overbroad in authorizing 
seizure of all ESM instead of only that which actually contained child 
pornography.43 The court held that the “significant burden” of 
 
 34. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (announcing the exclusionary rule, 
albeit in different terms); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 660 (1961) (incorporating 
the exclusionary rule against the states). 
 35. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 36. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 37. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (discussing the lineage of ESI search doctrine). 
 38. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 39. Id. at 595. 
 40. Id. at 595–96. The Tamura court further held that when the need for broad overseizure 
is known ahead of time, officers should inform the magistrate, who should authorize such 
seizure only upon determining that “no other practical alternative exists.” Id. 
 41. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). 
 42. United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 43. Id. at 973. 
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carrying properly equipped computers with trained personnel44 and 
the dangers and difficulties of on-site inspection45 meant that, as long 
as the affidavit gave a “reasonable explanation,” “blanket removal of 
all computer storage media for later examination” was quite 
reasonable.46 Thus, investigations involving computer evidence occur 
in two stages: first, there is a search of a physical place, followed by an 
en masse seizure of ESI or ESM; second, there is a search of the 
seized data for incriminating evidence.47 
The natural corollary question is how to regulate the subsequent 
search of the seized ESI. Until recently, there was no ex ante 
regulation of computer searches; courts, reasoning that “‘[t]here is no 
way to know what is in a file without examining its contents,’” refused 
to require restrictions in the warrant.48 Typically, the caveat would be 
affixed that, despite the need for an open-ended warrant, the 
reasonableness of the search would be reviewed ex post49—but at that 
later stage, the same logic has served to justify almost any search.50 
 
 44. See id. at 974 (quoting United States v. Hill (Hill I), 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088–89 
(C.D. Cal. 2004)) (noting the variety of operating systems, file systems, and media types). 
 45. Id. at 974–75 (citing the risk of “compromis[ing] the integrity of the evidence by 
attempting to access the data at the scene” and the “many hours and perhaps days” that 
examining every file might take (quoting Hill I, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1089)). 
 46. Id. at 976. As Josh Goldfoot, Senior Counsel of the Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section at the U.S. Department of Justice, points out, the reasonable explanation 
requirement has merely led to a rise in boilerplate language in warrant affidavits. See Goldfoot, 
supra note 2, at 136–37. 
 47. Kerr, supra note 2, at 547. Kerr offers the following metaphor: “data acquisition refers 
to collecting the hay, and data reduction involves looking through the haystack for the needle.” 
Id. 
 48. Hill II, 459 F.3d at 978 (quoting Hill I, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[S]earching the 
entire server was necessary . . . because individuals often mislabel directory files, the server 
might contain related websites, and the unallocated server space might contain materials 
pertaining to those websites.”); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 239 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding 
reasonable a search of a filesharing directory, under suspicion of child pornography, even 
though the scope of the warrant was “limited to evidence of financial crimes” because 
“criminals can easily alter file names and file extensions to conceal contraband”); United States 
v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] computer search must, by implication, 
authorize at least a cursory review of each file on the computer . . . .”); United States v. Burgess, 
576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n the end, there may be no practical substitute for 
actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and . . . documents . . . .”); Hill II, 459 F.3d at 978 
(“There is no way to know what is in a file without examining its contents . . . .” (quoting Hill I, 
322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090) (quotation marks omitted)). Of course, warrants that fail even to link 
the search to a particular crime will generally be invalidated. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 626 
F.3d 56, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidating a warrant that “failed to state with any level of 
particularity the specific criminal activity alleged or the type of digital evidence to be sought”); 
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Since then, attempts have been made—with varying degrees of 
success—to rein in computer searches both ex ante and ex post, but it 
is worth examining, first, some of the problems that arose in this 
context. 
II.  TWO PROBLEMS AND SOME SOLUTIONS 
Courts and commentators have tended to focus their ire on the 
problem of the plain view doctrine—its potential for licensing 
overbroad, general searches in the context of ESI.51 If law 
enforcement may lawfully view every file, evidence of any crime 
discovered will be admissible, as long as its incriminating character is 
immediately apparent. But less visible and arguably more perturbing 
is the predicament of the innocent suspect. In such a case, the officer 
executing the search is, in effect, in the position of proving a 
negative—that the seized data does not contain incriminating 
evidence—and often has the power to search every file seized to 
satisfy that condition.52  
A rigorous solution must address the root of the matter by 
cabining the permissible scope of ESI searches. This Part examines 
both problems in detail before exploring attempts to solve them, 
including scrutinizing the officer’s subjective intent, abolishing the 
plain view doctrine altogether, and requiring a search protocol in the 
warrant. 
A. The Plain-View Problem 
The admissibility of any evidence discovered in plain view during 
an authorized search revitalizes concerns about the very “general 
searches” the particularity requirement was supposed to avert.53 
There is no shortage of “low-level offenses” for which probable cause 
 
United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a warrant that “permitted 
the officers to search for anything—from child pornography to tax returns to private 
correspondence”—to be overbroad). 
 51. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. See generally Weir, supra note 5 (analyzing 
the circuit split concerning the plain view doctrine). 
 52. See Hill II, 459 F.3d at 974 (“To be certain that the medium in question does not 
contain any [incriminating] material, the officers would have to examine every one of what may 
be thousands of files on a disk . . . .”). As discussed in Part II.C.3, magistrates have increasingly 
been imposing a search protocol ex ante, but that practice has come under constitutional attack 
from at least one prominent scholar. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469–70 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(noting the tension between the plain view doctrine and the prohibition on general warrants). 
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can be “relatively easy to establish,” making it very easy to obtain a 
warrant to search an “unpopular or politically powerless” target.54 
The fear is that, having obtained such a pretextual warrant, police 
could conduct a general search, seizing evidence of any crime, 
whether it were in the warrant or not.55 
In the physical world, the Supreme Court initially addressed such 
concerns by requiring a subjective test of the officer’s intent: evidence 
unrelated to the justification for the search was inadmissible unless it 
came into plain view inadvertently.56 But in Horton v. California,57 the 
Court changed course and eliminated the subjective-intent element.58 
“Scrupulous adherence” to the particularity requirement, the Court 
held, was sufficient to obviate the possibility of general searches. The 
Court reasoned that as long as the warrant particularly described the 
place to be searched and the evidence sought, the officer was 
constrained by the corresponding permissible scope of the search.59 
Thus, even if the warrant was obtained by pretext, the Court 
reasoned that the officer could hardly use it to conduct a general 
search.60 
Even in the physical realm, this reasoning only goes so far: a 
sufficiently small pretextual “thing” can authorize a thoroughly 
comprehensive search.61 In the digital realm, courts routinely accept 
the assertion—ex post, at least—that any file may contain the 
evidence sought,62 fully vitiating the logic of Horton.63 The 
 
 54. Kerr, supra note 2, at 567 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–18 (2001)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Coolidge, 403 U.S at 469. Despite not commanding a majority, Justice Stewart 
announced a rule that, within nine years, was largely accepted by lower courts. Linda Novak, 
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 774 
(1980). 
 57. For a summary of the facts, see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 58. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1990). 
 59. Id. at 140 & n.10. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Weir, supra note 5, at 93 (observing that “a warrant to search a house for stolen 
diamonds . . . allows the police to search everything in the house because of the diamond’s small 
size”). 
 62. For examples from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, see supra note 
50. Of course, those same courts maintain that searches must be “limited in scope by the terms 
of the warrant’s authorization,” United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009), but 
this limitation has been given little content. 
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invasiveness of physical searches, however, is still bounded by the 
amount of time, money, and manpower that law enforcement can 
bring to bear.64 Searches of seized ESI, however, encounter 
significantly attenuated limits: a single agent can conduct the entire 
search, and he may search it at his convenience, over the course of 
months.65 Additionally, the agent has powerful tools at his disposal to 
organize, classify, and explore the data,66 in contrast to the methodical 
way in which a physical search must proceed. Furthermore, physical 
searches often take place with the suspect or a third party present,67 
introducing an observer who can testify as to whether the search was 
reasonable, whereas computer searches generally occur off-site, 
where the only prying eyes are those of the police. Thus, in the digital 
realm, both doctrinal and practical hurdles to pretextual searches are 
substantially removed; the plain view doctrine allows “an end-run 
around the particularity requirement” of the Fourth Amendment.68 
B. Innocent Suspects 
The plain-view problem in the context of ESI is highly visible to 
the judiciary because there is evidence of a crime and a defendant to 
challenge the search.69 But the lack of limits on searches of a suspect’s 
 
 63. For a discussion of one court’s attempt to rein this in, see infra Part II.C.1. For a 
discussion of search protocols, which significantly alleviate the problem but may be 
unconstitutional, see infra Part II.C.3. 
 64. Kerr, supra note 2, at 569 (observing that when searching a physical location, “[a] 
search team must be organized and trained; the location must be controlled during the 
execution of the search”). 
 65. Weir, supra note 5, at 93 (“Instead of many officers searching a house in haste, a single 
analyst can peruse a hard drive extensively and at his leisure, providing a low-cost search 
without time constraints.”). 
 66. See Robyn Burrows, Note, Judicial Confusion and the Digital Drug Dog Sniff: 
Pragmatic Solutions Permitting Warrantless Hashing of Known Illegal Files, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 255, 260 (2011) (“[Forensic] programs ‘index’ the imaged hard drive by organizing files 
into a searchable format. Using [forensic software], an examiner can perform keyword searches, 
recover deleted material, flag encrypted files, and analyze altered files.”); Wayne Jekot, 
Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity Requirement, PITT. J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y, Spring 2007, at 1, 45, available at http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php
/tlp/article/view/29/29 (discussing forensic software packages).  
 67. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 66, at 284–85 (noting that the presence of the individual 
being searched is a check on drug-dog sniffs). 
 68. Weir, supra note 5, at 87. 
 69. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 787 (1970) (noting that the Supreme Court “review[s] the conduct 
of police almost exclusively in criminal cases where the defendant is the asserted victim of police 
misconduct”). 
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data should be more troubling when the suspect is actually innocent, 
because the natural stopping point for the search is the last file on the 
computer. The Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Walser70 helps 
illustrate the issue. 
In Walser, the police had probable cause to search the defendant 
Walser’s hotel room for “evidence of the possession of controlled 
substances,” and received a warrant to that effect.71 The officer who 
executed the search found a computer, and began exploring its 
contents in the room.72 He found and opened some JPEG picture 
files, apparently suspecting that they might contain “images of drug 
use.”73 Upon discovering that they were, in fact, adult pornography, 
he seized the computer “in anticipation of conducting a more 
thorough search” off-site.74 
Once off-site, the officer navigated to the documents directory of 
a spreadsheet program, ostensibly continuing the search for “address 
books, spreadsheets, [and] databases” that might provide evidence of 
drug transactions.75 Out of “approximately ninety files and four sub-
folders,” however, he chose to open a movie file and discovered that 
it contained child pornography.76 Walser argued that opening the 
movie exceeded the scope of a warrant for records of drug 
transactions; the government countered that a computer search 
warrant authorized the search of every file.77 
The court was unwilling to announce quite so broad a rule. 
Seeking to avoid suppression, it emphasized the “restraint” the officer 
showed by subsequently requesting a second warrant rather than 
continuing to “rummage”—but implicitly, it held that opening a 
movie file was within the scope of a warrant for evidence of drug 
transactions.78 This is a stretch, but even assuming that the officer 
 
 70. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 71. Id. at 983. The magistrate issuing the warrant was not actually aware of the presence of 
a computer, id. at 983 n.1, but the warrant authorized, among other things, searching for 
“records, and/or receipts, written or electronically stored, income tax records, checking and 
savings records, records that show or tend to show ownership or control of the premises and 
other property used to facilitate the distribution and delivery [of] controlled substances,” id. at 
984 (alteration in original). 
 72. Id. at 984. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 984–85. 
 77. Id. at 987. 
 78. See id.  
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expected to find that Walser had conveniently taped himself 
participating in a drug deal—and was not merely curious about 
Walser’s pornography tastes—it should be troubling when one 
considers: What if Walser had been innocent?79 
When a suspect is innocent, there is no contraband to be found. 
However, having seized all of his data, there is no check to prevent 
zealous law enforcement from expanding an initially fruitless search 
into increasingly less pertinent areas, in search of evidence that is not 
there. If privacy is to have any meaning, this cannot be reasonable,80 
and in theory, law enforcement is disincentivized from doing so by the 
threat of suppression.81 But, as Walser shows, in the electronic domain 
that threat is simply not forthcoming. Ex post review is highly 
deferential when an expanding search does eventually uncover 
evidence of some crime.82 On the other hand, as long as the suspect is 
innocent, he will never know the extent of the intrusion to challenge 
it. The predicament of the innocent suspect—that his privacy is 
regulated by rules developed in the context of guilty suspects—is a 
familiar one, but it is profoundly magnified in the digital domain by 
the power of broad overseizure. 
C. Solutions 
The problem with the plain view doctrine in the digital realm—
that it removes the penalty for a general rummaging search—is but a 
symptom of the larger malaise: the police have the ability and, 
generally, the authority to rifle through an entire hard drive in search 
of evidence. As demonstrated by the problem of the innocent suspect, 
this is an unacceptable incursion on privacy interests83—even when a 
fishing expedition is not the motive. This state of affairs has not 
escaped judicial and critical notice. This Section describes and 
critiques the three solutions that have been proposed. The first two 
 
 79. He was not: marijuana and related paraphernalia were found in the room. Id. at 984. It 
is unclear whether he was ever prosecuted on that score. 
 80. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1123, 1133 (1996) (“The Constitution seeks to protect the innocent. The guilty, in 
general, receive procedural protection only as an incidental and unavoidable byproduct of 
protecting the innocent because of their innocence.”). 
 81. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 82. For further examples, see supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 75, 81 (1994) (“The variety of information commonly stored on a computer, and 
the enormous and ever-expanding storage capacity of even simple home computers, justifies the 
highest expectation of privacy.”). 
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tackle only the plain view doctrine; the third attempts to address the 
core privacy concern, but runs into constitutional and normative 
difficulties. 
1. Inadvertence Requirement.  An early response that focused on 
the plain-view problem was to effectively reinstate the subjective-
intent element for evidence discovered in plain view during searches 
of ESI. The oft-cited precedent in this line of decisions is United 
States v. Carey.84 In Carey, the defendant was being investigated for 
possession and sale of cocaine.85 The police obtained a warrant to 
search his computer for information relating to drug transactions.86 
The agent was unable to find any relevant files through keyword 
searches, but did notice some image files.87 He opened the first one, 
discovered it contained child pornography, “developed probable 
cause to believe the same kind of material was present on the other 
image files,” and proceeded to open several others without obtaining 
a new warrant.88 The court held that his discovery of the first file was 
inadvertent and therefore admissible, but, because he then 
“temporarily abandoned” the authorized search for evidence of drug 
trafficking and embarked on an unauthorized search for child 
pornography, the court suppressed the latter files.89 
In reinstating the inadvertence requirement for plain-view digital 
evidence, the court recognized that, in the digital context, the 
reasoning of Horton fails—the plain view doctrine can indeed “be 
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to 
another until something incriminating at last emerges.”90 However, 
Horton’s criticism of the inadvertence requirement remains apt for 
three main reasons. First, focusing on the “subjective state of mind of 
the officer” is still a poor way to achieve evenhanded law 
 
 84. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Mann, 
592 F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2010) (giving some weight to the officer’s inadvertence in affirming 
the lower court’s admission of evidence under the plain view doctrine); United States v. 
Schlingloff, No 11-40073, 2012 WL 4378148, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2012) (interpreting Mann as 
requiring inadvertence). 
 85. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1271. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1283 & n.4. 
 90. See id. at 1272 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality 
opinion)). 
ACHARYA IN PRINTER PROOF  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:51 PM 
2013] SEMANTIC SEARCHES 407 
enforcement,91 and the scope of a valid search is better defined by the 
object of the search.92 Second, Horton is still good law, and Carey is 
hard to square with it.93 Finally, the plain-view problem is the 
symptom but not the disease—even with an inadvertence 
requirement, the police may still scour all of a suspect’s data as long 
as they demonstrate their intention not to rummage by getting a 
second warrant when they find something unexpected.94 
2. Abolishing the Plain View Doctrine.  A second approach, 
proposed by Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and some 
scholars, is to eliminate the plain view doctrine entirely for electronic 
searches.95 This is strong medicine that cuts deeply into the societal 
interest in crime control, and needs correspondingly strong 
justification.96 The idea seems to be that if the only evidence usable in 
a prosecution is that related to the justification for the search, then a 
fishing expedition cannot possibly yield any dividends. This 
justification is unrealistic, may even be counterproductive, and still 
fails to address the base privacy concerns. 
First, given the reality of broad overseizure and off-site search, 
the cost of an exploratory search is quite low,97 but the returns can be 
enormous. Even if unrelated evidence cannot be used directly, the 
police are now aware of it. That bell cannot be unrung. As with all 
 
 91. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). For example, given two searches that are 
identical from the point of view of the suspect, the admissibility of plain-view evidence would 
depend on the inherently unreliable determination of the officer’s subjective state of mind. In 
addition, a subjective-intent inquiry would have the perverse effect of excluding evidence which 
the police had some expectation of finding, but not on evidence sufficient to constitute probable 
cause. 
 92. Id. at 139–40. 
 93. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself may be retreating from this doctrine. See United States 
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that Carey be limited to its facts). 
 94. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.  
 95. E.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“Magistrate judges should insist that the 
government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.”); Kerr, supra 
note 2, at 576–84 (arguing that “the best way to neutralize dragnet searches is to rethink the 
plain view exception in the context of digital evidence”); Weir, supra note 5, at 113 (“[C]ourts 
should act as the Ninth Circuit did and abolish the doctrine’s application to digital searches.”). 
 96. See Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the 
Need for Clearer Rules To Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 311, 344 (2010) (“Abolishing the plain view doctrine with respect to digital searches may 
create risks to society that outweigh those created by governmental intrusion into individual 
privacy.”). 
 97. See supra notes 64–68. 
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applications of the exclusionary rule, if the purpose of the search is 
something other than eventual prosecution—such as embarrassment 
or harassment—excluding plain-view evidence would have no effect 
on police incentives.98 Alternately, the police may use that evidence to 
further an investigation, as long as the evidence eventually introduced 
in court is sufficiently attenuated or might inevitably have been 
discovered.99 Thus, a pretextual warrant can pay significant dividends. 
Second, abolishing the plain view doctrine may actually be 
counterproductive. The advantages for law enforcement of the plain 
view doctrine are obvious, but it is good for privacy interests, too. The 
plain view doctrine incentivizes police to constrain their search: the 
reward for “scrupulous adherence” to the permitted scope of search is 
the admission of any evidence not in the warrant but found in plain 
view.100 If the police are “undeterred by a potential loss of plain-view 
evidence,” there will be no concern about invasiveness to balance the 
zealous pursuit of evidence.101 Indeed, for this reason, abolishing the 
plain view doctrine may be worse for innocent suspects. 
Third, regardless of the motives of the police—whether the 
warrant is legitimate or pretextual—abolishing the plain view 
doctrine does nothing to address the basic problem of protecting 
legitimate expectations of privacy after broad overseizure. This is also 
why a related proposal, that data irrelevant to the investigation 
should be sequestered by a third party, preferably independent of the 
government,102 is not useful—the privacy violation occurs regardless 
of who is employing the violator.103 To be fair, however, Chief Judge 
Kozinski’s proposal included a very privacy-protective doctrinal 
modification: search protocols. 
 
 98. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 
918 n.79 (1991) (“When the motivation for the police conduct is not evidence-gathering, the 
exclusionary rule imposes no cost on the police officer, and consequently cannot deter 
misconduct.”). 
 99. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37, 539 (1988). 
 100. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1990). The question of the permissible 
scope of a search of ESI is, of course, fundamental and contested. Under current rules, see supra 
Part I.B, the scope is everything seized. 
 101. Weir, supra note 5, at 105. 
 102. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
 103. When combined with a search protocol, as in Chief Judge Kozinski’s proposal, such a 
rule makes some sense, as it “keep[s] as many eyes off non-seizable information as possible.” 
See Weir, supra note 5, at 104. 
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3. Search Protocols.  In 1994, Professor Raphael Winick, noting 
that searches of ESI are likely to involve “large quantities of personal 
information . . . intermingled with relevant information,” presciently 
proposed that warrants include a search protocol: “an outline of the 
methods that [investigators] will use to sort through the 
information.”104 Carey, though best known for reintroducing the 
inadvertence requirement, also quoted extensively from Winick’s 
work,105 and in the past decade, federal magistrate judges around the 
country have increasingly required that a search protocol be attached 
to a computer warrant.106 In 2010, Chief Judge Kozinski urged 
magistrate judges to “insert[] a protocol for preventing agents 
involved in the investigation from examining . . . data other than that 
for which probable cause is shown.”107 
At first glance, search protocols make a lot of sense. Because 
they preclude forensic officers from trawling through the entirety of 
the data looking for evidence, search protocols prevent the plain view 
doctrine from effectively authorizing general searches in the digital 
world, much as the particularity requirement prevents the plain view 
doctrine from doing so in the physical world.108 For the same reason, 
search protocols also protect the innocent suspect from the exposure 
 
 104. Winick, supra note 83, at 107–08. 
 105. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *7 (D. 
Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012); In re U.S.’s 
Application for Search Warrant To Seize and Search Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152–53 (W.D. Wash. 2011); In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 
2d 953, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Search Warrant, 2012 VT 102, ¶ 7. The search protocol in 
Ganias is typical, and authorized the following techniques: 
(a) surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain 
(analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and 
opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files); 
(b) “opening” or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to 
determine their precise contents; 
(c) “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files; 
(d) “scanning” storage areas for deliberately hidden files; or 
(e) performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine 
whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are 
intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation. 
Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *7. 
 107. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1179. 
 108. Chief Judge Kozinski proposed to include search protocols as well as to eliminate the 
plain view doctrine and require third-party segregation of data. Id. at 1180; see Weir, supra note 
5, at 103–05. Such an approach would arguably confer stronger privacy protection in the digital 
realm than in the physical realm. 
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of all of his data to government eyes. Unlike the other attempted 
solutions, search protocols address the privacy problem directly. 
Kerr has argued, however, that specifying a search protocol in 
the warrant is neither constitutionally permissible nor good policy.109 
His constitutional argument relies on four cases, in nonelectronic but 
plausibly analogous settings, holding, respectively, that warrants need 
not necessarily specify a method of execution;110 that agents may 
disregard an express knock-and-announce requirement—that is, a 
protocol for the search—so long as their actions are reasonable;111 that 
the particularity requirement extends only to the place to be searched 
and the property to be seized;112 and that a magistrate judge, having 
issued a warrant for probable cause and with particularity, may not 
further involve himself in its execution.113 Taken together, these cases 
at least cast doubt on the putative binding effect of a search protocol; 
Kerr believes that they “point to the conclusion that the Fourth 
Amendment does not permit ex ante restrictions on the execution of 
computer warrants.”114 
Kerr further argues that search protocols, despite their laudable 
goal of protecting individual Fourth Amendment interests,115 are in 
fact poor policy. He argues that search protocols are essentially ex 
ante attempts to regulate reasonableness,116 which, in the absence of 
concrete facts, must be little more than guesses as to what will be 
reasonable.117 In fact, he reasons, search protocols can inhibit the 
development of rules for reasonable computer searches ex post, by 
 
 109. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1246. 
 110. See id. at 1264–66 (discussing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)). 
 111. See id. at 1268–71 (discussing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)). 
 112. See id. at 1267–68 (discussing United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006)). 
 113. See id. at 1261–64 (discussing Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)). 
 114. Id. at 1271. However, the only court to examine this argument thus far has found that 
these cases support not the proposition that search warrants are unconstitutional, but “two more 
modest conclusions: that ex ante evaluation by a judicial officer cannot wholly supplant ex post 
assessment of law enforcement conduct and that hard and fast rules about what a warrant must 
and must not include are generally frowned upon.” In re Search Warrant, 2012 VT 102,  ¶ 24 
n.11. For another very narrow reading of these cases, see generally Paul Ohm, Massive Hard 
Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 
(2011), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/03/20/ohm.pdf. 
 115. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1247 (stressing that his argument is “about means rather than 
ends”). 
 116. Id. at 1277. 
 117. See id. at 1279 (“[The reasonableness] standard requires courts to ‘slosh [their] way 
through the factbound morass’ . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 
U.S. 372, 383 (2007))). 
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focusing litigation on compliance with the protocol rather than 
directly on the reasonableness of the search.118 Thus, even if search 
protocols are constitutionally permissible, he asserts, magistrate 
judges should avoid them.119 
III.  PARTICULARITY AND PERSPECTIVE 
Kerr has proposed abandoning ex ante limitations on computer 
searches altogether, leaving the problem of protecting privacy to the 
requirement that searches be reasonable.120 But that requirement has 
thus far been wholly vacuous.121 Proponents of search protocols have 
the right idea—enunciating ex ante bounds to prevent the privacy 
violation before it occurs. The problem is that search protocols are 
the wrong implementation—they regulate how a search is executed, 
rather than where and for what. The Constitution explicitly 
contemplates a kind of ex ante restriction, which computer searches 
have been entirely lacking: particularity.122 
This Part argues that the key to vindicating privacy interests in 
the new digital reality lies in the Fourth Amendment requirement 
that warrants specify a particular place to be searched. The first 
Section explores the particular need for particularity as an ex ante 
check on police action in the digital realm. The second Section 
evaluates different ways of conceptualizing data, with particular 
attention to conceptualizing data as places. The final Section proposes 
a new way to think about data—the semantic perspective, which 
conceives of data as consisting of domains of meaning. It then 
examines the rules that emerge from this perspective, explores the 
advantages of this approach, and attempts to anticipate some 
objections. 
 
 118. Id. at 1289. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 1247 (“[L]imitations . . . on the execution of computer warrants . . . should be 
developed and identified in ex post challenges.”). 
 121. See supra Part I.B. Notably, Kerr’s proposed rules for reasonable searches would 
eliminate the plain view doctrine. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1287. 
 122. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 4 (“[Search protocols] are designed to cure the manifest 
lack of probable cause and particularity in almost every computer case.”); see also In re Search 
of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958–59 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting the special 
particularity concerns for computer searches because of broad overseizure). 
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A. Particularity is Particularly Necessary 
The constitutional requirement of particularity in the warrant, an 
ex ante limit on the scope of a search, has doctrinal and normative 
functions that are particularly important in the context of computer 
warrants. Doctrinally, it explicitly requires ex ante limits customized 
to the particular case at hand in addition to the general requirement 
of reasonableness. Normatively, it guides the reasonable execution of 
searches by informing and alerting all the relevant actors in a given 
search—the police, the judiciary, and the suspect—to the particular 
privacy interests at stake. Because police can seize all of a suspect’s 
data and search it later, both are crucial. 
1. Particularity and Doctrine.  The Fourth Amendment, “even 
more than its fellows, . . . was the product of particular events that 
closely preceded the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”123 The 
primary thrust of the Amendment was prohibiting general searches, 
implemented by the requirement of particularity in the warrant.124 
Indeed, in contrast to the modern focus on the requirement that 
searches be reasonable, state constitution precursors to the Fourth 
Amendment “seem[] to show that the general principle [that searches 
must be reasonable] was stated merely as a basis for the minor 
premise condemning general warrants and that the abuse attempted 
to be prevented was that of general warrants only.”125 And yet, as one 
scholar has noted, “[c]omputer search warrants are the closest things 
to general warrants we have confronted in the history of the 
Republic.”126 Computer warrants specify neither what to seize nor 
where to search.127 
Rules of reasonableness, developed ex post at trial or on review, 
are a general sort of rule—they apply to any search that presents the 
 
 123. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1969). 
 124. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 125. LASSON, supra note 22, at 81 n.10; see also id. at 79 n.3 (quoting the Virginia Bill of 
Rights’ precursor to the Fourth Amendment, VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. X, 
which only prohibited general warrants and made no mention of reasonableness); id. at 81 n.12 
(quoting the Maryland clause, MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XXVI, which also 
prohibits general warrants without mentioning reasonableness); id. at 101–03 (noting that the 
House of Representatives never voted on the current phrasing of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the version that was voted upon did not prohibit unreasonable search and seizure per se). 
 126. Ohm, supra note 114, at 11. 
 127. See supra Part I.B. 
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predicate fact-pattern during its execution.128 The particularity 
requirement is different: it generates rules that are tailored to the case 
at hand and cabin the search before it is executed. The point of the 
particularity requirement is to define the outer bounds of the search 
using the information available ex ante, that is, the facts establishing 
probable cause.129 If that information can support a more particular 
description of the place or the thing for which there is probable cause, 
then the warrant must be more particular.130 Particularity, probable 
cause, and the magistrate constitute the essential ex ante trifecta of 
the Fourth Amendment—a “neutral and detached” third party, not 
“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime,”131 ensuring that there is “a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”132 
Normally, “scrupulous adherence” to the particularity 
requirement in the warrant—and the corresponding permissible 
scope of the search—justifies the plain view doctrine.133 This is why 
doctrinal changes that aim to “solve” the plain-view problem are 
operating at the wrong level: the root of the problem is that 
particularity in computer search warrants has thus far been missing.134 
It is not sufficient that computer warrants merely state the evidence 
sought or the crime committed. Given the reality of broad 
overseizure and the absence of conventional checks in an off-site 
search of ESI,135 that leaves entirely too much to the discretion of the 
searching agent, who may explore as much of the data as is necessary 
 
 128. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1279 (“For each set of facts, the courts articulate what the 
officers can do and cannot do as they execute the warrant.”). 
 129. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (holding that a particular warrant 
must “limit[] the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is 
probable cause to search”). 
 130. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 824 (1982) (“[P]robable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage 
will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom . . . .”); Marron v. United States, 275 
U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant.”). 
 131. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 132. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 133. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 134. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(“[W]hat the government seeks is a license to roam through everything in the computer without 
limitation and without standards. Such a request fails to satisfy the particularity requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
 135. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
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to find the evidence sought.136 But if the thing to be seized cannot be 
specified with any particularity, computer warrants must limit the 
place within ESI that the agent may search. Otherwise, the plain view 
doctrine will become a license for general searches and fishing 
expeditions in the digital realm.137 
2. Normative Function.  The Supreme Court has explained that in 
physical searches, particularity helps the suspect understand the 
justification for the search and its corresponding bounds.138 In the 
context of digital evidence, in which broad overseizure is the norm, 
the police and the judiciary, too, must be aware of the justifiable 
extent of the search. Accordingly, in addition to the doctrinal need 
for particularity in the warrant, particularity plays a normative role 
that is critical in the digital realm. 
First, particularity alerts law enforcement to the fact that 
although a broad array of information has been seized, the 
investigation has a substantially narrower scope, and the suspect has 
not relinquished his legitimate privacy interests in information 
outside that scope.139 Short of eliminating broad overseizure, this is 
the single greatest protection that can be afforded the innocent 
suspect, who will almost never be able to vindicate his privacy rights 
before a judge.140 Rather than weigh an abstract notion of privacy 
against the need to expand the search to find the expected evidence, 
the officer will have an independent, objective judgment as to how 
far, concretely, the privacy violation is justified.141  
Second, particularity is an aid to the judiciary ex post in 
evaluating whether the scope of the search was truly reasonable. 
 
 136. Cf. LASSON, supra note 22, at 54 (“The writ [of assistance] empowered the officer and 
his deputies and servants to search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to 
be, and to break open any receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.”). 
 137. Accordingly, search protocols, for all their flaws, can be viewed as an attempt to 
regulate the place that can be searched. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 9–10 (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment requires that the place to be searched be particularly described and arguing 
that search protocols satisfy this requirement).  
 138. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004). 
 139. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 5 (observing that probable cause typically only exists for a 
small portion of the seized data); id. at 7–8 (noting that computers store increasing amounts of 
increasingly sensitive data). 
 140. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *3 (D. 
Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012) (discussing a 
complicated chain of custody for Ganias’s data, wherein each recipient was notified of the 
appropriate zone of search authorized by the magistrate). 
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When, as is usually the case for ex post review, evidence of some 
crime was found, the objective judgment of the proper scope ex ante 
helps to balance the natural ex post bias in favor of law 
enforcement.142 It provides a critical backdrop against which to 
evaluate the steps law enforcement took143—or, alternately, vindicates 
those steps by virtue of additional warrant requests that serve as a 
coarse public record.144 
Third, “[a] particular warrant also ‘assures the individual whose 
property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing 
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’”145 
Specifically for computer warrants, particularity helps assure the 
suspect that despite the broad overseizure of his data, his every word 
and deed is not open to examination by the authorities. Particularity 
limits, supported by probable cause, vetted ex ante by a magistrate, 
are a cornerstone of the lawful use of police power; when the actual 
seizure is far broader than the “things” for which there is probable 
cause, the importance of particularity in searching within those things 
is correspondingly much greater. The obvious question, then, is what 
well-formed, constitutional, ex ante particularity limits look like in 
the electronic world. 
B. Perspectives on ESI 
To talk coherently about limits, it is necessary first to decide 
what ESI looks like—how it should be perceived. It takes little 
imagination to conceive of data as comprising a place, or rather, 
 
 142. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1291 (“[E]x ante review of probable cause and particularity 
ensures that the assessment of the government’s interest is unbiased by the eventual discovery 
of evidence or contraband in the place to be searched.” (citing Stuntz, supra note 98, at 916, 
934)). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (marking the government’s “callous disregard” of a warrant’s 
search protocol and limited scope). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Hughes 
immediately closed the gallery view when he observed a possible criminal violation outside the 
scope of the warrant’s search authorization and did not renew the search until he obtained a 
new warrant.”); Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *6 (observing, using a search protocol as a proxy 
for place-particularity, that the agents “viewed only data that had been extracted according[]” to 
the search protocol, and that, when the agents needed to expand their search, they applied for a 
second warrant). 
 145. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
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multiple places, not all of which must be searched.146 Most people 
have asked themselves, at some point: “Where did I put that file?” 
The harder question is: What do those places look like? The choice of 
perspective ripples throughout the application of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, impacting the definition of a search,147 the zone of a search,148 
and, importantly, the language available for a magistrate to articulate 
limits ex ante. There are essentially three perspectives that have been 
propounded thus far: the filesystem perspective, the exposure-based 
perspective, and the physical perspective. 
1. The Filesystem Perspective.  The most intuitive way to think 
about computer data is in terms of how the filesystem and operating 
system structure it.149 Under this conception, the physical hard drive is 
a container; it contains folders and files, each of which is a separate 
container that may contain more containers.150 This perspective is 
attractive because it comports with the physical metaphors that 
computers use to represent data: “files,” “folders,” “the desktop,” 
and so on.151 In addition to the intuitive familiarity of this perspective, 
it is attractive because it appears to allow traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to transfer with minimal changes to the digital 
realm.152 This promise has not been borne out. 
The basic idea is that if data is a series of nested containers, then 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine concerning closed containers 
should apply in the digital realm without more.153 Thus, a search 
 
 146. See Jekot, supra note 66, at 35 (“Computer storage devices do not contain just one 
place; they hold multifarious data, such as metadata and user and system files and folders, in 
numerous small spaces, including bits and bytes and slack and unallocated spaces.”). 
 147. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 554 (“The zone of a search determines the extent to which a 
particular search in a space eliminates privacy protection elsewhere in that space.”). This is 
distinct from the scope of a search. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 149. This has variously been called “the subcontainer perspective,” Goldfoot, supra note 2, 
at 118–20, and the “virtual file” approach, Kerr, supra note 2, at 554–57. 
 150. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 119. 
 151. See ANDY RATHBONE, WINDOWS XP FOR DUMMIES 20 (2d ed. 2004) (“You can create 
files and folders right on your new electronic desktop . . . .”).  
 152. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 123–24 (noting efforts “to render the existing physical 
rules abstract, and then use them to govern forensic examiners’ work”); Ohm, supra note 114, at 
5 (describing the common Fourth Amendment analogy from computers to filing cabinets). 
 153. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 555 (“If you analogize a computer hard drive to a suitcase, 
each file is like its own individual zippered pocket in the suitcase.”). 
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occurs when a container (a folder or a file) is opened;154 the zone of 
the search is the entire container, so having opened a file, for 
example, the police may view as much of it as they would like;155 
and—herein lies the rub—the only language available to limit a 
search ex ante is the language of files and folders. Of course, the 
police are not usually familiar with the suspect’s file organization or 
naming scheme ex ante, and accordingly warrants simply elide ex ante 
limits altogether.156 But the structure of the filesystem has little to do 
with the probable cause for the search—viewed through the lens of 
files and folders, there is probable cause for every subcontainer.157 
Thus, the filesystem perspective is the source of the plain-view 
problem.158 
Furthermore, many files are themselves containers, such as 
database files,159 “page files,”160 and Windows Registry files,161 so they 
have high evidentiary value because they are repositories for 
multifarious data from different sources.162 For instance, if a website is 
 
 154. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that opening 
files can expand the scope of a search). 
 155. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 556 (observing that the filesystem perspective would permit 
an officer to expose every page of a hundred-page open document). 
 156. The argument for eliding limits is similar to the one for broad overseizure. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Forcing police to limit their 
searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way would be much like saying 
police may not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ or 
‘talcum powder.’”); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The government 
knew that Evans had sent 19 images directly to Hay’s computer, but had no way of knowing 
where the images were stored.”). 
 157. Hay, 231 F.3d at 635 (“[T]he inquiry . . . is whether there was reasonable cause to 
believe the 19 files from Evans’s computer were located somewhere in Hay’s computer . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 158. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 149 (observing that the filesystem perspective, with the 
plain view doctrine and without search protocols, turns ESM into “a single unit, in practice 
incapable of meaningful subdivision”). 
 159. See, e.g., 14.5. The MyISAM Storage Engine, MYSQL 5.5 REFERENCE MANUAL, 
http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.5/en/myisam-storage-engine.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) 
(explaining that MySQL, a popular database program, using MyISAM, a popular storage 
engine, stores the database as three files, one of which contains all the data, which is subdivided 
into tables).  
 160. See MARK E. RUSSINOVICH & DAVID A. SOLOMON, WINDOWS INTERNALS PART 1, at 
15 (6th ed. 2012) (“Because most systems have much less physical memory than [they need], the 
memory manager transfers . . . some of the memory contents . . . to disk [to] free[] physical 
memory so that it can be used for other processes or for the operating system itself.”). 
 161. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 127. 
 162. See id. at 129–30 (“One file can mix a drop of responsive data into a sea of 
unresponsive material—just as a hard drive can.”). 
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stored as a database and there is probable cause to search the activity 
of one user, the filesystem perspective does not differentiate between 
searching his data and searching the entire database; as long as the 
database is one file,163 probable cause to search some of the file is 
indistinguishable from probable cause to search all of the file.164 
Finally, ESM includes data that is not stored in files and folders 
at all, but either as part of the filesystem or outside of it. The first type 
of data is known as metadata,165 and includes the file name, owner, 
and creation and access times.166 The second is unallocated space, 
which will often include remnants of deleted files.167 Both of these can 
be highly valuable to the forensic examiner, but the filesystem 
perspective simply breaks down when considering them.168 Thus, the 
filesystem perspective is not merely inadequate but in fact incoherent 
for describing zones of privacy on ESM. 
2. The Exposure-Based Perspective.  Kerr has proposed an 
exposure-based conception of searches of ESI that rectifies some—
but not all—of the problems with the filesystem perspective. Under 
this conception, exposure of data to human observation is a search, 
and the zone of a computer search is coterminous with the extent of 
the information exposed.169 Thus, every action that exposes new 
information—such as scrolling down a spreadsheet or querying a 
table from a database—is a new search.170 This approach has the 
advantage of capturing searches that expose metadata or deleted files, 
as well as properly treating files that are themselves subcontainers as 
“containing distinct zones of privacy.”171 However, it does not solve 
 
 163. See id. at 130 (“A SQL database, holding all of a dynamic web site’s data, might be a 
single file.”). 
 164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 165. See DOMINIC GIAMPAOLO, PRACTICAL FILESYSTEM DESIGN 10 (1999) (“[Metadata is] 
information about the file that is not in the stream of bytes that make up the file.”). 
 166. Id.; see Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 128–29. 
 167. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 128. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Kerr, supra note 2, at 556–57. 
 170. Id. The distinction between the zone of the search and the scope of the warrant 
becomes important here; most of the time, a warrant that authorizes searching part of a file will 
authorize searching all of it. Id. at 557. 
 171. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 116; see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (criticizing officers for not being more selective in the portions of a 
spreadsheet they viewed). 
ACHARYA IN PRINTER PROOF  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:51 PM 
2013] SEMANTIC SEARCHES 419 
the particularity problem—it provides no new vocabulary to describe 
zones of privacy ex ante. 
3. The Physical Perspective.  Goldfoot has recently proffered a 
third perspective, under which a hard drive is viewed as nothing more 
than another physical object, like a blood sample or a pair of jeans.172 
It is not searched at all; once lawfully seized, it is merely 
“examined.”173 Under this perspective, concerns like zone of search 
and particularity simply fade away. ESI is treated not as distinct from 
ESM,174 but merely as physical properties of ESM that happen to 
reveal information.175 Thus, the examiner need not “worry[] about 
whether his next mouse click will violate the Bill of Rights.”176 
The physical perspective is conceptually perhaps the cleanest 
perspective on ESI thus far, but that cleanliness comes at the cost of 
abandoning any restrictions on searches of seized ESM. Goldfoot 
contends that calls for such restrictions are essentially policy 
arguments rather than arguments about what level of protection is 
constitutionally required.177 But unlike the private information that 
jeans can carry, like the wear level on a right-side pocket,178 much of 
the data ESM carries are not epiphenomena of existence; they are 
intentionally created works, intentionally stored there.179 A single 
one-by-one-half-inch USB stick could store its owner’s journal, 
rolodex, calendar, to-do list, shopping list, “bucket” list—indeed, lists 
of every shape and form—library card, entire libraries, music, films, 
receipts, correspondence, accounts and finances, photo albums—all 
sorts of “papers” and “effects”180—and the physical perspective would 
 
 172. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 150 (providing an admirable exegesis of the variety of 
information that can be deduced from a pair of jeans). 
 173. Id. at 157. 
 174. As Goldfoot acknowledges, when the suspect’s ESM is imaged on-site, as this Note has 
assumed throughout, the physical perspective is less clear about what constitutes a seizure. Id. at 
158–60. 
 175. Id. at 155. 
 176. Id. at 157. 
 177. See id. at 160 (“At some point, the debate between the subcontainer and physical 
perspectives becomes a public policy debate.”); id. at 166 (arguing that the 
“increase[d] . . . threats to public safety” posed by the growing use of computers “might warrant 
a change in law enforcement’s favor”). 
 178. See id. at 150 (“A worn right pocket suggests [the owner] favors that hand.”). 
 179. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 8 (“Our computers track what we read, buy, where we go, 
and increasingly, what we think.” (emphasis added)). 
 180. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing protection for “papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures”); Winick, supra note 83, at 81 (“The intangible nature of 
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present the entire corpus to law enforcement for their perusal, on 
probable cause for any pretextual crime.181 This is not a policy 
argument; the policy choice is enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.182 
Even for inadvertently created data, which might be likened to 
the information that can be gleaned from a pair of jeans, the sheer 
scale of the potential privacy invasion makes ESM qualitatively 
different without more.183 That is particularly true when one considers 
that ESM often stores both intentionally and inadvertently created 
data of other parties not suspected of crime—perhaps hundreds of 
other parties184—a fact that is becoming increasingly salient with the 
rise in cloud computing, wherein one’s “email messages, word 
processing documents, voice mail messages, and business data [are 
commingled] on shared servers alongside the data of innumerable 
strangers.”185 Finally, the physical perspective treats computers, cell 
phones, and so on, as simply self-contained pieces of plastic and 
silicon—but they are networked machines, and searching one can 
reveal information well outside its physical boundaries.186 The physical 
perspective is thus no more coherent than the filesystem perspective. 
C. The Semantic Perspective 
On the one hand, the physical perspective conceives of ESM as 
one monolithic zone of privacy, wholly forfeited once seized, despite 
widely held expectations of privacy that society is almost certainly 
 
computer data does not affect the analysis, since the Court has long recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects ‘intangible as well as tangible evidence.’” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 305 (1967))). 
 181. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 182. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[T]he enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”). 
 183. Consider, for example, inadvertently created records like chat logs, which store 
verbatim every careless word typed to a friend. Chat History, GOOGLE CHAT HELP, 
http://support.google.com/chat/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=161925 (last visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
 184. It is telling that the Ninth Circuit’s highly privacy-protective framework was conceived 
in the context of a system that stored sensitive data concerning “hundreds of players in Major 
League Baseball (and a great many other people),” for only ten of whom the government had 
probable cause to search. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 185. Ohm, supra note 114, at 7 (quoting Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1176) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 186. See, e.g., Washington v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461, 463 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a 
police officer’s impersonation of a suspect by using a seized cell phone to send text messages). 
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“prepared to recognize as reasonable.”187 On the other hand, the 
filesystem perspective recognizes that seized data holds multiple 
zones of privacy, but it attempts to describe those zones using a poor 
proxy—files and folders. This Section proposes a new perspective, the 
semantic perspective, that does away with the proxy. When the 
domain of search is information, the particular place within it must be 
described semantically. 
1. Semantic Zones.  The semantic perspective is directly 
responsive to the problem with broad overseizure, in that all of one’s 
content is seized, but only some types of content could reasonably 
contain the evidence sought.188 Accordingly, a semantic zone is the set 
of areas on a hard drive that responds to a particular semantic 
description—in other words, those areas that contain a particular type 
of content. Thus, semantic descriptions are articulated not in 
structural or technical terms, but in natural language, as descriptions 
of content. For example, image-related data, as applied to a particular 
hard drive, describes a semantic zone: it is the set of areas on the 
drive that contain image-related content, including image files, 
metadata for image files, application data for image-editing software, 
fragments of image files in unallocated space, and so on.189 All of 
these things, in terms of human meaning, are image-related data. 
The meaningfulness of a semantic description190 can vary broadly, 
and semantic zones can be nested and overlap. For example, guilt-
related data is a conceivable semantic zone—the set of areas on the 
hard drive containing evidence of a suspect’s guilt—but finding that 
set of areas requires a very deep understanding of the meaning of the 
data, either via human inspection or a perfect forensic tool.191 On the 
other hand, image-related data is much less meaningful and 
accordingly much more amenable to automated extraction.192 The 
meaningfulness of a given semantic description thus has important 
 
 187. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 188. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 189. A search continues to be defined as exposure of data to human observation under this 
perspective, as such exposure almost always involves exposing the meaning of the data.  
 190. “Meaningfulness,” here, refers to the extent to which the description refers to the 
underlying meaning of the data. 
 191. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570 (discussing a hypothetical “Perfect Tool” that could 
“magically locate evidence described in a warrant”). 
 192. For examples of tools that can automatically extract data responsive to a semantic 
description, see infra notes 199–205 and accompanying text. 
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implications for its workability, but for now, the key point is that 
semantic descriptions describe zones on a hard drive that, in the 
language of the Fourth Amendment, can operate as a “place to be 
searched.”193 
2. The New Rules of Particularity.  A computer warrant that 
meets the particularity requirement should describe one or more 
semantic zones for which there is probable cause. For example, when 
the probable cause is for child pornography, the warrant might 
authorize a search for image-related data; evidence of tax fraud would 
support a warrant for spreadsheet data; evidence of unauthorized 
access, source code and shell scripts; and so on. 
The police should not search—that is, expose to human 
observation—data outside the authorized semantic zones.194 The 
suspect retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in those semantic 
zones not related to the investigation. Thus, for example, a warrant 
for spreadsheet data will support searching Registry entries 
concerning Microsoft Excel, but not necessarily adjacent entries, and 
certainly not fragments of image files in unallocated space or the 
creation time of a movie file. On the other hand, because semantic 
zones constrain computer warrants and searches—just as particular 
places do in the physical realm—in a manner tailored to the 
information available ex ante, the plain view doctrine remains viable 
in the digital realm.195 
There is an inherent tension in these rules: How are the police to 
know what parts of the hard drive correspond to a given semantic 
description without looking at them?196 The definition of a Fourth 
Amendment search in the digital realm is exposure to human 
observation.197 The corollary is that law enforcement is free to employ 
unlimited automatic tools to analyze ESI without running afoul of the 
 
 193. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 194. This is not dissimilar to the rule governing the reasonable scope of physical searches, 
but here, by virtue of the semantic zone, some authority is shifted to the magistrate. See infra 
notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 195. For a practical example, see infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. In general, 
when a warrant specifies a particular semantic zone, as long as the officer “scrupulous[ly] 
adhere[s]” to that limitation, the plain view doctrine cannot be used to conduct a general search. 
See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 196. Cf., e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he warrant 
impliedly authorized officers to open each file on the computer and view its contents, at least 
cursorily, to determine whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization.”). 
 197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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Fourth Amendment.198 There is an abundance of such tools—tools 
that sort and categorize data without human intervention—that law 
enforcement can use: keyword search,199 file-header “magic tests” that 
determine a file’s format regardless of filename,200 natural language 
search,201 hash matching,202 image signature recognition,203 optical 
character recognition (OCR),204 and many more.205 The ability of 
computers to automatically segregate data by the type of content it 
represents is only improving.206 Law enforcement can use such tools to 
 
 198. An important question, outside the scope of this Note, is whether law enforcement can 
run certain automatic analyses on all seized data regardless of why it was seized; for example, 
whether they can check every hard drive they seize for known child pornography. See infra note 
202. The Supreme Court has said that “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a 
prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 560 (1976) (emphasis added), but also that “[o]fficial conduct that does not compromise 
any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search,” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) 
(quotation marks omitted), and that “governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of 
contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest,” id. at 408 (quotation marks omitted). 
See generally Burrows, supra note 66 (analogizing child-pornography dragnets to dog-sniff 
searches per Caballes). This Note, however, concentrates on the use of automatic searches to 
limit privacy violations outside the parameters of probable cause. 
 199. See Winick, supra note 83, at 108 (advocating keyword searches to limit the scope of a 
warrant). 
 200. See FILE(1), FREEBSD GENERAL COMMANDS MANUAL (Oct. 9, 2008), 
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=file&manpath=FreeBSD+9.0-RELEASE (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2013) (using a magic number in the header of a file to divine a file’s format, even 
if it has been misnamed). 
 201. E.g., About Wolfram|Alpha, WOLFRAM|ALPHA, http://www.wolframalpha.com/about.
html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (accepting search queries in “[f]ree-form natural language 
input”); Siri, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ios/siri (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“Ask Siri to do 
things just by talking the way you talk.”); cf. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138 (asserting that 
automated techniques cannot catch “unanticipated wording, an egregious misspelling, an 
unexpected foreign language, [or] recently invented slang”). 
 202. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, ACCESS DATA 25 (Oct. 2, 2012), https://ad-
pdf.s3.amazonaws.com/FTK4-1_UG.pdf (describing the “Known File Filter,” which 
“compare[s] file hashes in a case against a database of hashes” to either eliminate irrelevant files 
or pinpoint known contraband, like child pornography). 
 203. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TINEYE, http://www.tineye.com/faq#how (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2013) (using a “unique and compact digital signature or ‘fingerprint’” to match images).  
 204. See Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 72 (“The Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR) process lets you extract text that is contained in graphics files. The text is 
then indexed so that it can be[] searched[] and bookmarked.”). 
 205. See, e.g., id. at 73 (detailing an Explicit Image Detection feature that scores files 
according to their likelihood of containing “possibly illicit content”). 
 206. See, e.g., Samy Bengio, Large-Scale Visual Semantic Extraction, in NAT’L ACAD. 
ENG’RS, FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING: REPORTS ON LEADING-EDGE ENGINEERING FROM 
THE 2011 SYMPOSIUM 61 (2012) (presenting an algorithm to describe an image in natural 
language from a dictionary of one-hundred thousand or more terms); Hao Tang, Vivek Kwatra, 
Mehmet Emre Sargin & Ullas Gargi, Detecting Highlights in Sports Videos: Cricket as a Test 
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determine, without executing a Fourth Amendment search, the areas 
of ESM that are responsive to a given semantic description.207 
The fact that semantic zones are not continuous should be of no 
concern; neither are files. The filesystem breaks files up into blocks, 
which can be placed anywhere on the disk—a “file” is simply an 
abstraction provided by the filesystem to present the data to 
programs and to the user as a single continuous piece of data.208 The 
filesystem perspective is one superstructure for organizing the 
arbitrary block-level layout of the data.209 The semantic perspective is 
simply another superstructure, but one that has the fortuitous 
property of being able to describe zones of privacy—semantic 
zones—ex ante. 
Semantic descriptions should be construed narrowly,210 but law 
enforcement can broaden the search by applying for a second 
 
Case, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MULTIMEDIA 
AND EXPO 1, 1 (2011) (presenting an algorithm to automatically “detect[] highlights in sports 
videos” in a sport-neutral way using a variety of machine-learning techniques (emphasis 
omitted)). See generally Ajay J. Joshi, Fatih Porikli & Nikolaos P. Papanikolopoulos, Scalable 
Active Learning for Multiclass Image Classification, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN 
ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 2259 (2012) (presenting techniques to train large 
image-classification systems with minimal training samples). 
 207. This should not be read as an argument in the form of “technological solutionism.” See 
generally EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013). Some semantic descriptions will be too “meaningful” 
for computers ever to effectively isolate responsive data, such as guilt-related data. See supra 
notes 190–93 and accompanying text. Magistrates should take care to stay abreast of 
developments in technology that can impact how meaningful a semantic description can 
workably be. Of course, if the authorized semantic zone turns out to be unworkably fine-
grained, the investigating officer can always explain this in an affidavit requesting a broader 
warrant, see infra Part IV.A.3, or the officer may be protected by the plain view doctrine, see 
infra Part IV.B. The key point, once a minimum level of technology has been reached—which it 
has, see supra notes 199–206—is that semantic zones provide an operable and permissible 
approach to particularizing computer search warrants, regardless of the technology used or 
available. 
 208. See GIAMPAOLO, supra note 165, at 11 (“A file appears as a continuous stream of bytes 
at higher levels, but the blocks that contain the file data may not be contiguous on disk.”). 
 209. As a practical matter, the semantic zone filenames should always be implicitly 
authorized, to allow forensic tools to present the responsive areas in a meaningful way. 
Similarly, if the facts of the case require exposure of data stored in a file-level subcontainer, 
such as a database, the structural information in that file (for databases, the schema) should also 
be authorized to allow automated queries to meaningfully return narrow portions of the file. 
See, e.g., HECTOR GARCIA-MOLINA, JEFFREY D. ULLMAN & JENNIFER WIDOM, DATABASE 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 2, 14 (2000) (explaining that a schema is “a description of the 
structure of the data in a database”). 
 210. For example, a warrant authorizing image data ought not to be construed to include 
video data, although it might include animated GIF files. 
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warrant. On the one hand, narrow construction incentivizes law 
enforcement to use the best tools available to sequester 
nonresponsive private data, deploying their powerful forensic tools to 
protect, rather than compromise, a suspect’s privacy.211 On the other 
hand, if information outside the authorized semantic zone is relevant 
to the investigation, if ESM cannot be carved up as finely as the 
magistrate envisioned, or if searching within the authorized zone 
reveals evidence of another crime, the police should simply apply for 
a second warrant, supported by probable cause, to expand the search 
to a new (and still particular) semantic zone.212 
The corollary of this rule is a more ongoing, supervisory role for 
the magistrate—a role necessary in the presence of broad overseizure. 
In the physical realm, the police must make real-time decisions about 
the scope of a search, checked for reasonableness ex post; that level 
of discretion is both necessitated and justified by the real-time nature 
of the search. In the digital realm, the converse is true. On the one 
hand, the off-site nature of a search of seized ESI makes it possible to 
impose greater limits on the scope ex ante, because those limits can 
be tweaked as the facts of the case develop.213 On the other hand, to 
guard against abuse of the awesome power of broad overseizure, it 
becomes necessary to interpose “a neutral and detached magistrate” 
between “zealous officers” and a decision to expand the zone of 
 
 211. Semantic zones effectively require law enforcement to use the closest-available 
approximations to Professor Kerr’s “Perfect Tool.” See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570. Accordingly, 
it is the semantic breadth of the description, rather than the technical, filesystem-level breadth, 
which should be construed narrowly. By contrast, the technical dimension of semantic zones 
should be construed broadly—if a given file is responsive to a semantic zone description, so is its 
metadata, the configuration or temporary cache data for the application that created it, and so 
on, thus avoiding some of the pitfalls of the filesystem perspective. See supra notes 165–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 212. Goldfoot complains about “empty formality” second-warrant requirements that 
generate affidavits such as: “I saw child pornography on that hard drive; therefore, I submit 
there is probable cause to believe there is child pornography on that hard drive.” Goldfoot, 
supra note 2, at 145. This type of second warrant should be rare with semantic zones, because if 
one image falls within the authorized semantic zone, the rest likely do as well. See infra notes 
264–67 and accompanying text. 
 213. Whereas “exigent circumstances” justify eliding the warrant requirement and 
concomitant objective review of probable cause, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 
(1990), off-site searches present positively leisurely circumstances. See In re Search of 3817 W. 
West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“[W]hen the government wishes to search a 
computer hard drive in the controlled environment of a laboratory, it is not confronted with a 
rapidly evolving and sometimes dangerous situation that must be addressed on the spot.”).  
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search.214 Effectively, some of the real-time discretion in whether to 
search for “an adult elephant . . . in a chest of drawers”215 is 
withdrawn—no longer checked for reasonableness ex post, but 
limited in the warrant ex ante, subject to expansion with probable 
cause. Thus, the off-site nature of the search is converted from a 
liability for privacy interests into an asset. 
3. Objections.  At the outset, it must be noted that any limit on 
police investigations will mean that some crimes go undetected. That 
is the price of having a Fourth Amendment—that is, of barring 
general searches and protecting innocent suspects. The semantic 
perspective draws the boundary of a search, as is traditional, around 
data for which law enforcement has probable cause.216 In any case, as 
long as the suspect is not innocent, the semantic-zones approach 
largely mimics the computer forensic methods already in use by law 
enforcement; the first stroke of an investigation is often to separate 
the relevant from the irrelevant.217 Additionally, the ability to obtain a 
new warrant if probable cause is established for an additional 
semantic zone ensures that law enforcement is hardly hamstrung. 
Semantic zones, therefore, protect innocent suspects from a 
thoroughgoing search of their data far more than they prevent the 
discovery of evidence. 
Goldfoot, however, asserts that automated techniques are 
insufficient to segregate data for which there is probable cause.218 His 
argument is mostly targeted toward simplistic techniques such as 
 
 214. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). On the distinction between the 
second-warrant applications discussed here and the magistrate’s participation in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), see infra note 230. 
 215. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 
1999). There are significant operational similarities between the semantic-zones approach and 
the reasonable scope of a physical search. The key observation in both situations is that law 
enforcement can get some idea of what an area might reasonably contain before searching it, 
and that regulates their discretion to search it. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (asserting that crime control and privacy 
should be balanced using “the textual and traditional standard of probable cause”). 
 217. Cf. Burrows, supra note 66, at 260–61 (noting that once a forensic software loads an 
image of a hard drive, it indexes the data along various axes including file type, keyword, and so 
on); Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 76–77 (describing different ways to refine a 
search of digital evidence). For example, in United States v. Ganias,  the “first attempted search . 
. . yielded too many results for a practicable review,” leading the agents to “narrow the search of 
the data” for reasons entirely unrelated to privacy concerns. United States v. Ganias, No. 
3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *4 (D. Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 
12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 218. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 137–38. 
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keyword and filename searches, but modern forensic tools are far 
more sophisticated, increasingly capable of identifying the meaning 
represented on a given area of ESM.219 For semantic zones to work, 
all that is necessary is that a minimum level of technology be available 
to automatically classify data.220 Of course, magistrates should keep in 
mind the changing capability of computers to understand human 
meaning when writing semantic descriptions,221 but any 
miscalculations on that score can be dealt with by applying for a new 
warrant222 or under the plain view doctrine.223 
Goldfoot further asserts that, even with sophisticated tools, the 
art of computer forensics is not amenable to mechanization, “because 
forensics is detective work . . . [which] involves applying background 
knowledge, intuition, and professional judgment.”224 Happily, the 
semantic-zones approach withdraws none of these faculties from 
forensic examiners. A semantic zone includes not only areas that are 
directly responsive to the zone description, but also areas that hold 
ancillary data like metadata and configuration data.225 The only 
restriction is that inferential leaps that take the examiner outside the 
zone of established probable cause must be vetted by a magistrate.226 
4. Semantic Zones Versus Search Protocols.  Semantic zones 
avoid the constitutional and normative hazards that, as Kerr pointed 
out, afflict search protocols.227 Semantic zones, unlike search 
protocols, mandate no particular method of search, but merely 
 
 219. See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. In particular, the repeated canard that 
“much evidence could escape discovery simply because of [the defendant’s] labeling of the files 
documenting [his] criminal activity,” United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 
2006), simply does not hold water. None of the techniques enumerated above rely on the files’ 
labeling. This is not like “saying police may not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white 
substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ or ‘talcum powder,’” United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966, 
978 (9th Cir. 2006), but more like requiring that the police test it with a machine to investigate 
whether it is cocaine, rather than take a bump. 
 220. See supra note 207. 
 221. For a concrete discussion in the context of a child pornography investigation, see infra 
notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 222. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 223. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. 
 224. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138. 
 225. See supra note 211. 
 226. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[T]he usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence [must, under the Fourth Amendment,] be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). 
 227. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
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restrict the search to particular areas of the hard drive. It is only as a 
corollary of how those areas are identified (by human meaning) and 
how “searching” data is defined (exposure to human observation) 
that the forensic process (using automated techniques to locate the 
semantic zone) is constrained. Thus, there is no ex ante attempt to 
“guess what would be reasonable.”228 A semantic zone warrant 
restricts the search using only information available ex ante—the 
probable cause for the search in the first place.229 Kerr’s constitutional 
arguments are also largely inapplicable for the same reason—the 
Constitution requires ex ante restrictions on the “particular place” to 
be searched, and semantic zones fill that doctrinal and normative gap 
for searches of ESI.230 
Much like semantic zones, search protocols aim to identify the 
class of data relevant to the investigation; unlike semantic zones, 
search protocols go on to dictate how agents may locate that class of 
data. This difference does have important ramifications. In United 
States v. Ganias,231 for example, Ganias was not initially a suspect, but 
rather a third party whose computer may have contained tax data 
incriminating the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, the search 
protocol limited the search to data “intimately related to the subject 
matter of the investigation”232—essentially a very meaningful233 
semantic zone. The warrant also specified how the agents should find 
 
 228. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1277–78, 1287 (summarizing his basic normative argument against 
ex ante limits). 
 229. Cf. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1277 (decrying search protocols as “error-prone ex ante 
judicial review” whose utility diminishes as rules of reasonableness are developed ex post).  
 230. Kerr’s discussion of Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York may require further distinguishing. 
See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1261–64. In Lo-Ji Sales, the local magistrate accompanied the police 
officers in the execution of the search of an adult bookstore, purporting to determine on-site 
which materials to seize for probable cause for obscenity. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 
U.S. 319, 322–23 (1979). The Supreme Court invalidated the warrant and seizure for two 
reasons: because the open-ended warrant was insufficiently particular and because the 
magistrate had abandoned his “neutral and detached posture” and “allowed himself to become 
a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation.” Id. at 
325–27. By contrast, semantic zones cut back on the generality of computer warrants. Even 
though the magistrate is involved in a sort of supervision, that involvement is mediated through 
the traditional process of warrant applications. Indeed, multiple courts have expressly relied on 
the officer’s having applied for a second warrant, upon discovering probable cause to search 
what was effectively a new semantic zone, in upholding the search. See supra note 144. 
 231. United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396 (D. Conn. June 
24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 232. Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *7. 
 233. Id. at *7. For an explanation of “meaningfulness” in this context, see supra notes 190–
93, 207 and accompanying text. 
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that data: manual techniques such as “cursorily reading the first few 
‘pages’ of . . . files in order to determine their precise contents,” as 
well as automated techniques such as “key word searches.”234 
On the one hand, such manual techniques allow very meaningful 
semantic zones to be specified, which can further protection of the 
suspect’s privacy; automated techniques would likely not have been 
able to differentiate between Ganias’s tax data and that of the entities 
under investigation. On the other hand, search protocols often 
involve manual techniques to locate relevant data—effectively, 
peeking at it—that provide little guidance to law enforcement and can 
severely undercut any privacy-protection goals. In addition, the 
search warrant here could be read to forbid advanced automated 
techniques not known to the magistrate—precisely the concern of 
scholars like Professor Kerr.235 
IV.  TEST CASES 
At this point, some examples may help illustrate how semantic 
zones will work. The primary question ex ante will be what semantic 
zone ought to be authorized given the information available. The 
nature of the crime, changes in technology, the way the information is 
stored, and information that the police can gather without actually 
searching the data will all be factors in that determination. Ex post 
suppression litigation will likely focus on whether the evidence was 
actually within the authorized semantic zone, and if not, whether it 
falls within the plain view doctrine. This Part tackles each question in 
turn, using the facts of various real and hypothetical cases. 
A. The Appropriate Semantic Zone 
In United States v. Storm,236 Storm’s then-girlfriend informed the 
police that she had found child pornography in the defendant’s 
recently viewed files.237 The magistrate issued a warrant to search all 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1287 (“Ex ante restrictions effectively delegate the Fourth 
Amendment to magistrate judges, transforming Fourth Amendment litigation away from an 
inquiry into reasonableness and towards an inquiry into compliance with the magistrate’s 
commands.”). 
 236. United States v. Storm, No. 3:11–cr–00373–SI, 2012 WL 3643845 (D. Or. Aug. 23, 
2012). 
 237. Id. at *1. 
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of the ESM, which the court upheld.238 Recall that the warrant must 
only authorize search of the particular area for which there is 
probable cause.239 Under the semantic-zones approach, the question 
is: In what place—what semantic zone—was there probable cause to 
search?240 
On the one hand, the entire hard drive would certainly have 
been too broad—there was no probable cause to search, for example, 
Storm’s calendar or tax returns, because they could not reasonably 
have contained child pornography. Authorizing such a search would 
be akin to authorizing the search of a chest of drawers for an adult 
elephant.241 On the other hand, Storm argued that the search should 
be limited to the files his girlfriend saw, his recently viewed files.242 
That would certainly have been too narrow; it was quite probable that 
he possessed more than what his girlfriend discovered. There was 
probable cause to suspect that, in his image and video data, he 
possessed child pornography—that is the appropriate semantic zone. 
That would authorize law enforcement to scan his hard drive for 
image and video headers and view any responsive files (including 
misleadingly named files),243 fragments of files, recoverable deleted 
files, or files inside “compound files such as ZIP, email, and OLE 
files,”244 but not to review his other documents for miscellaneous 
criminality.245 Storm is a relatively simple case. Other fact patterns can 
give rise to harder questions, explored below. 
1. Changing Technology.  What about narrowing the semantic 
zone in Storm further, by limiting the search to pornographic image 
and video data? This is a workable semantic zone—modern forensic 
tools already have the capability to return only images likely to be 
 
 238. Id. at *11. 
 239. See supra notes 24–27. 
 240. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 241. Cf. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 242. Storm, 2012 WL 3643845, at *11. 
 243. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 545 (“Software can locate image files . . . by searching for file 
headers characteristic of known types of picture files. . . . The file header remains unchanged 
regardless of the extension placed on the file, . . . [and] file header characteristics can be located 
in slack space or in partially deleted files . . . .”); supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 244. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 60. 
 245. See United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (suggesting that without such 
limits, officers “might review expense reports, income-related files and correspondence, and 
federal filing information in search of evidence of tax evasion”). 
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pornographic.246 An even narrower semantic zone could be conceived: 
child-pornographic image and video data. The potential for a 
semantically narrow description will increase with the ability of 
computers to understand human meaning, but magistrate judges 
should be aware of technological limitations when requiring 
semantically narrow zones; a too-meaningful semantic zone, like guilt-
related data,247 will not be workable. Here, although there is not yet 
technology that can specifically identify child-pornographic images 
while excluding legal pornography,248 limiting the search to 
pornographic image data is technologically feasible and would avoid 
exposure of embarrassing but legally insignificant photos. 
2. Structured Data.  The potential for a semantically narrow 
description will also vary with the degree of structure the data is 
given. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.249 provides 
illustrative facts. The government had probable cause to believe that 
ten baseball players were using illegal steroids, but the records they 
sought were kept in a Microsoft Excel-format spreadsheet containing 
the drug-testing records of hundreds of other players “and a great 
many other people.”250 The warrant only authorized search of the 
records of the ten players.251 Excel spreadsheets are basically 
unstructured—even though columns and rows may be labeled, there 
is no programmatic association between those labels and the 
associated data. That is, there is no way to “query” an Excel 
spreadsheet for information only about one person. Once the 
spreadsheet is open, all the data is visible. Thus, the semantic zone 
drug-test results for specific players was unworkable.252 
 
 246. See Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 182 (explaining the Explicit Image 
Detection feature). 
 247. For a discussion of the variable meaningfulness of semantic descriptions, see supra 
notes 190–93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of technological solutionism and the 
generality of the semantic-zones approach, see supra note 207. 
 248. Of course, the technology does exist to identify specific, known images of child 
pornography. See supra note 202. 
 249. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
 250. Id. at 1166. 
 251. Id. 
 252. There are a few contingent facts that have been omitted for simplicity. As Judge Bea 
noted in his concurrence, large spreadsheets are usually not displayed in their entirety, and in 
this case, it was possible to “seize” the data in the authorized semantic zone without exposing 
the incriminating data as to other players. Id. at 1180–81. The search warrant also included a 
number of other procedural safeguards that the government brazenly ignored, such as initial 
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By contrast, modern relational-database systems store data in a 
structured way, using a user-defined schema that attaches labels to 
and establishes interrelationships within the data.253 Such databases 
are not accessed by exposing the entire file, but rather through 
queries that selectively return information based on particular 
parameters.254 Essentially, had the Comprehensive Drug Testing data 
been stored in a relational database, it would have been perfectly 
natural to expose data player by player,255 and accordingly far more 
workable to authorize the narrow semantic zone drug-test results for 
specific players. 
3. Broadening the Search.  One common complaint from those 
who oppose restrictive warrants for digital evidence is that privacy-
protective restrictions will allow clever criminals to evade detection. 
Goldfoot insists that automated techniques will not catch, for 
example, “pictures of documents.”256 But this is patently false; modern 
forensics software includes OCR technology that can recognize and 
extract text in images.257 The harder question is what agents ought to 
do when, for example, in connection with tax fraud, a warrant 
authorizes searching text-document and spreadsheet data, but the 
clever fraudster has hidden his incriminating documents in images, 
which are off-limits.258 
Suppose the agents develop a suspicion, based perhaps on the 
abundance of image files and dearth of incriminating data, that this is 
the case. According to the warrant, the agents may not search the 
image data—but that regulates exposure only to human observation. 
They may run a combination of OCR analysis and keyword search on 
the images, and any resulting match is new evidence with which they 
can request a second warrant to search image-related data. The 
general principle is that when the authorized semantic zone is 
unavailing but the government remains suspicious, automated 
 
segregation of the data by personnel not involved in the case, to avoid exposure of data for 
which there was no probable cause. Id. at 1168–69. Thus, here, the results were suppressed. 
 253. GARCIA-MOLINA ET AL., supra note 209, at 2, 14. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See ROBERT SHELDON & GEOFF MOES, BEGINNING MYSQL 250–52 (2005) (describing 
how to select particular rows to view from a MySQL database). 
 256. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138.  
 257. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 72. 
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Evanson, No. 2:05-CR-805-TC, 2007 WL 4299191, at *5 (D. 
Utah Dec. 5, 2007) (describing evidence stored in image files, albeit only because the suspect 
was “transforming his operation into a paperless type office”). 
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analyses can be run on the rest of the data to justify broadening the 
search. 
4. Physical Crime, Digital Evidence.  Sometimes the connection 
between the suspected crime and the expected evidence will be more 
oblique than with tax fraud or child pornography. Drug trafficking is 
a good example—the evidence tends to be physical, such as “cash . . . , 
[m]arijuana, [c]ocaine, [m]ethamphetamine, or other illegal 
controlled substances, along with associated paraphernalia.”259 Some 
types of evidence that “tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs,” 
however, such as “pay-owe sheets, address books, [and] rolodexes,” 
are increasingly stored electronically.260 As indicated in the 
Introduction, this type of evidence is likely to turn up in spreadsheets, 
text documents, and data files for electronic address books. But, 
having seized all of a suspect’s data, agents may assert a need to 
search more attenuated semantic zones such as image data, averring 
that drug traffickers sometimes take “trophy photos,” or “pictures of 
a person holding the controlled substance in front of a stack of 
money.”261 Obviously, looking through all of a suspect’s photos entails 
a deep intrusion upon his privacy, and, in such cases, magistrates 
should evaluate the strength of the evidence presented against the 
breadth of the proposed semantic zone in making the probable-cause 
determination. At the end of the day, the magistrate has broad 
discretion as to how intrusive the search may be—and, as a “neutral 
and detached” third party, that is exactly with whom the discretion 
should lie.262 
B. Suppression Litigation 
The question whether a particular piece of evidence was found 
within the authorized semantic zone will be most contentious when 
the semantic zone is narrow, and either the technology is not able to 
draw such fine lines or the data is insufficiently structured. It is again 
useful to consider Comprehensive Drug Testing.263 Suppose the 
 
 259. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting a search 
warrant). 
 260. Id. (quoting a search warrant). 
 261. Id. at 1084. 
 262. See supra note 226. 
 263. For the facts of the case, see supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text. For the 
purposes of this discussion, again, ignore the contingent facts discussed above, see supra note 
252. 
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government opened the lawfully seized spreadsheet and the 
incriminating nature of hundreds of rows for hundreds of players was 
immediately apparent.264 This is essentially an application of the plain 
view doctrine, and the key question will be whether the incriminating 
evidence lawfully came into the government’s view.265 
Much as in the traditional scope of search analysis, the test in this 
case should be reasonableness—whether the government could 
reasonably have viewed the ten rows without exposing the rest.266 In 
an Excel spreadsheet, this is typically not the case. By contrast, had 
the data been stored in a relational database, it would have been 
trivial to craft a query that returned only the results for the players 
for which the government had probable cause, and if the government 
had chosen instead to dump the data en masse, that would have been 
unreasonable and the evidence should have been suppressed.267 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Scalia wrote in Arizona v. Hicks, “[T]here is nothing 
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the 
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all”; the 
appropriate question is “where the proper balance should be 
struck.”268 The arguments presented here could be adapted to call for 
an end to broad overseizure as well, substituting on-site, automatic 
assessment and seizure of responsive areas of ESM.269 This Note, on 
the other hand, accepts that forensic analysts cannot effectively apply 
their “art” without the expediency of broad overseizure.270 But the 
power to seize everything and search it later is both awesome and 
terrible, and if we have decided, as a society, to allow it in the interest 
of preventing crime, there must be an equally significant check to 
 
 264. As Judge Bea’s opinion highlights, the incriminating nature was not immediately 
apparent—the agents had to expose more data first. United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 265. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
 268. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1986). 
 269. At least one author has suggested something along these lines. See Jekot, supra note 66, 
at 46–47 (“[A] new ‘best practices’ search warrant should authorize the on-site search for a 
particular class or classes of data, and seizures of only the data that is relevant to the crime 
being investigated.”). 
 270. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 547 (“[I]t is . . . difficult to plan a computer search ex ante; 
the search procedures are . . . more of an art than a science.”). 
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ensure against its abuse.271 Semantic zones are the right check. They 
are constitutionally grounded, effective, and responsive to the basic 
apprehension about broad overseizure: that once “back [in] the lab,” 
the government will “have a good look around”272 without being 
particularly—well, particular. 
 
 271. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“Power is a heady thing; and 
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.”). 
 272. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
